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Introduction 
The fields of cognitive science and artificial intelligence attempt to understand the 
mechanisms underlying intelligent behavior. However, many different approaches are con-
sistent with this general goal, and various frameworks have been proposed for explaining 
intelligence. In this book we focus on one such approach, known as production systems, 
that has received considerable attention both within cognitive psychology and artificial 
intelligence. Moreover, we will limit our attention to production system models of learning 
and development, since this has been an active area of research that we feel has considerable 
long-term significance. 
In the current chapter, we will introduce the production system framework and argue 
for the importance of studying learning phenomena. Both the chapter and the book are 
based on the assumption that our understanding of the psychological phenomena can be 
advanced by constructing and evaluating computational models of intelligent behavior. 
Although some readers may question this assumption, we do not have the space to defend 
it here. However, we refer interested parties to treatments of the issue by Newell & Simon 
(1972) and Anderson (1976). 
Even when applied to relatively circumscribed domains, and even without the added 
complexity of self-modifiability, production systems are difficult to formulate and to un-
derstand. It is not surprising, therefore, that after almost two decades, only a handful 
of psychologists have attempted to use them. For some investigators, production systems 
have a forbidding aura of esoteric mystery and complexity. For others, they seem to repre-
sent an unconstrained proliferation of arbitrary assumptions and idiosyncratic notations. 
The "cost" of production systems is obviously high, and the "benefits" have not been 
immediately apparent. 
In this chapter, we will attempt to clarify the benefit and, to some extent, reduce the 
cost by explaining the basics of production systems and discussing their relation to other 
areas of psychology and artificial intelligence. As editors, we are well aware that many of 
the subsequent chapters in this book are not easy reading. However, we will make a case 
for why they are worth the reader's effort. The central argument has two parts. First, 
learning and development are the fundamental issues in human psychology. Second, self-
modifying production systems, although admittedly complex entities, represent one of the 
best theoretical tools currently available for understanding learning and development. 
In making this argument, it is important to distinguish two related but necessarily dis-
tinct views of the role of production system models. The first framework treats production 
systems as a formal notation for expressing models. Viewed in this way, it is the content 
of the models, rather than the form of their expression or their interpretation scheme that 
is the object of interest. For example, one might characterize the rules a person uses to 
perform some task in terms of a production system. This type of modeling represents an 
attempt to formally specify the allowable "behaviors" of a system just as a grammar is 
intended to define the legal sentences in a language. Other formalisms for expressing the 
same content are possible (such as scripts, LISP programs·, flow-charts, and so on), and 
one can debate their relative merits (c.f., Klahr & Siegler, 1978). 
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In contrast, the second view treats the interpreter of a production system1 as a highly 
specific theory about the architecture of the human information-processing system. In its 
strongest form, this view asserts that humans actually employ the functional equivalent 
of productions in reasoning, understanding language, and other intelligent behavior. This 
second view also attributes great importance to the ability of production systems models 
to modify themselves in ways that capture many of the central features of learning and 
development. 
We believe that it is the second view, originally put forward by Newell (1967) and 
most extensively applied by Anderson (1983), that provides the major justification for the 
use of production systems in modeling human behavior. In other words, if we are simply 
interested in the content of a domain, then in many cases the complexity of a production 
system formulation may just not be worth the effort. On the other hand, if we view the 
production system framework as a serious assertion about the fundamental organization 
of performance and learning processes, then the effort is justified. 
Even the earliest production system models were designed to capture the characteristic 
features of the human cognitive architecture. Efforts to explore those characteristics at 
deeper and more concrete levels led - not surprisingly - to the discovery of technical and 
theoretical problems concerning management of search and control of attention. Efforts 
to address those problems, both within the community of production system builders and 
the closely related community of rule-based expert system builders, have fed back into the 
search for architectures that more closely reflect properties of human cognition. Issues of 
learning and human development have been a major forcing function in the definition of 
the problems, and have served as a crucial testing ground for proposed solutions. The 
resulting architectures have implications not only for learning, but also for the broader 
nature of intelligent behavior and the structure of intelligent systems. 
We begin the chapter with an introduction to production systems, using a simple ex-
ample from the domain of multi-column subtraction, and follow this with a brief history of 
the development of production systems in psychology. We then consider some phenomena 
of learning and development, and review some of the mechanisms that have been proposed 
to account for these phenomena within the production system framework. In closing, we 
discuss some implications of learning issues for production system models. 
1 We will use the term "production system" is used in two distinct senses. The first 
refers to a theory of the cognitive architecture, independent of particular programs that 
are implemented within this framework. The second refers to specific sets of condition-
action rules that run within such an architecture. In general, the intended meaning should 
be clear from the context. Within artificial intelligence, the term "production system" 
sometimes includes backward chaining rule-based systems, such as that used in MYCIN 
(Shortliffe, 1976). However, we will use the term in the more limited (forward chaining) 
sense. 
2 
An Overview of Production Systems 
Before moving on to the use of production systems in modeling learning and devel-
opment, we should first introduce the reader to the concepts and mechanisms on which 
they are based. In this section we outline the basic components of production system 
architectures, and follow this with an example of a simple production system program for 
solving multi-column subtraction problems. After these preliminaries, we review some of 
the arguments that have been made in favor of production system models and consider 
exactly what we mean by a production system "architecture". 
The Components of a Production System 
The basic structure of production system programs (and their associated interpreter) is 
quite simple. In its most fundamental form, a production system consists of two interacting 
data structures, connected through a simple processing cycle: 
• A working memory consisting of a collection of symbolic data items called working 
memory elements; 
• A production memory consisting of condition-action rules called productions, the con-
ditions of which describe configurations of elements that might appear in working 
memory, and the actions of which specify modifications to the contents of working 
memory; 
• Production memory and working memory are related through the recognize-act cycle. 
This consists of three distinct stages: 
o The match process, which finds productions whose conditions match against the 
current state of working memory; the same rule may match against memory in 
different ways, and each such mapping is called an instantiation. 
o The conflict resolution process, which selects one or more of the instantiated pro-
ductions for application; 
o The act process, which applies the instantiated actions of the selected rules, thus 
modifying the contents of working memory. 
The basic recognize-act process operates in cycles, with one or more rules being selected 
and applied, the new contents of memory leading another set of rules to be applied, and so 
forth. This cycling continues until no rules are matched or until an explicit halt command 
is encountered. Obviously, this account ignores many of the details, as well as the many 
variations that are possible within the basic framework, but it conveys the basic idea of a 
production system. 
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A Production System for Subtraction 
Now that we have considered production systems in. the abstract, let us examine a 
specific example from the domain of arithmetic. Multi-column subtraction problems are 
most naturally represented in terms of rows and columns, with each row-column pair 
containing a number or a blank. The basic operators in subtraction involve finding the 
difference between two numbers in a given column, decrementing the top number in a 
column, and adding ten to the top number in a column. However, the need to borrow 
forces some sort of control symbols or goals, in order to distinguish between the column 
for which one is currently trying to find an answer and the column from which one is 
currently trying to borrow. 
Before considering our production system for subtraction, we should consider the rep-
resentation used for elements in working memory against which our rules will match. 
Suppose we have the problem 87 - 31, before the system has started trying to find an 
answer. We will represent this as a number of separate propositions, one for each number. 
For instance, the fact that the number 8 occurs in the top row and the leftmost column 
would be stored as (8 in column-2 row-1), in which the names for columns and rows are 
arbitrary. The positions of the remaining numbers would be represented by the elements 
(3 in column-2 row-2), (7 in column-1 row-1), and (1 in column-1 row-2). Since the posi-
tion for each column's result is blank, the elements (blank result-for column-2) and (blank 
result-for column-1) would also be present. 
Three types of relations must also be stored in memory. The first two involve the 
spatial relations above and left-of, and are used in elements like (row-1 above row-2) and 
(column-2 left-of column-1). These translate into English as "row-1 is above row-2" and 
"column-2 is left of column-1", respectively. Naturally, the arguments of above are always 
rows, while the arguments of left-of are always columns. The final predicate is the greater-
than relation, which takes two numbers as its arguments. This relation occurs in elements 
such as (3 greater-than 1), which means "3 is greater than 1" .2 
One must also be able to distinguish between the column for which we are currently 
computing a result and the column which is the current focus of attention. We will use 
the label processing for the first and the label focused-on for the second. Since one always 
starts subtraction problems by working on the rightmost column, and since the initial focus 
of attention also resides there, we would begin with the additional elements (processing 
column-1) and (focused-on column-1). 
Now let us examine the productions which operate upon this representation. We will 
present an English paraphrase of each rule and consider the role played by each condition 
and action. Italicized terms in the paraphrased rules stand for variables, which can match 
against any symbol as long as they do so consistently across conditions. In our discussion 
2 Since there are 10 digits, some 45 binary greater-than relations exist. Rather than stor-
ing these explicitly in working memory, one might insert a LISP function in the condition 
side to test whether this relation is met. Although this is not psychologically plausible, it 
considerably simplifies the implementation. 
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of a given production, we will refer to specific conditions by their position in the rule. E.g., 
the parenthetical expression (2) will stand for the second condition in a production. After 
we have described each of the rules individually, we will examine the manner in which they 
interact during two sample runs. 
The most basic action in subtraction problems involves finding the difference between 
two digits in the same column. The FIND-DIFFERENCE rule is responsible for im-
plementing this behavior, and matches when the column currently being processed (1) 
contains a top number (2, 4) which is greater than or equal to (5) the bottom number (3, 
4). Its actions include computing the difference between the two numbers, and writing 
the difference as the result for that column. We are assuming that the system has the 
primitive capability of correctly finding the difference between two digits. 
FIND-DIFFERENCE 
If you are processing column, 
and number1 is in column and row1, 
and number2 is in column and row2, 
and row1 is above row2, 
and number1 is greater than or equal to number2, 
then compute the difference of number1 and number2, 
and write the result in column. 
Once the result for the current column has been filled in with a digit (i.e., when the 
current column has been successfully processed), it is time to move on. If there is a column 
to the left of the current column (3), then the rule SHIFT-COLUMN matches, shifting 
processing and the focus of attention to the new column. Thus, this rule is responsible for 
ensuring that right to left processing of the columns occurs. 
SHIFT-COLUMN 
If you are processing column1, 
and you are currently focused on column1, 
and the result in column1 is not blank, 
and column2 is left of column1, 
then note that you are now processing column2, 
and note that you are focusing on column2. 
A special operator is needed for cases in which the bottom row in a column is occupied 
by a blank (since one can only find differences between numbers). The FIND-TOP rule 
h·andles this situation, matching in any case involving a number above a blank (2, 3, 4) in 
the column being processed (1). Upon application, the rule simply stores the top number 
as the result for that column. This will only occur in the leftmost columns of certain 
problems, such as 3456 - 21. 
5 
FIND-TOP 
If you are processing column, 
and number is in column and row1, 
and column and row2 is blank, 
and row1 is above row2, 
then write number as the result of column. 
In cases where the top number in a column is smaller than the bottom number, the 
ADD-TEN rule must add ten to the top number (2, 3) before the system can find an 
acceptable difference for the column currently in focus (1). However, this rule will only 
match if the system has just applied its DECREMENT operator (4), and finding a column 
from which one can decrement is not always a simple matter, as we will see. 
ADD-TEN 
If you are focusing on column1, 
and number1 is in column1 and row1, 
and row1 is above row2, 
and you have just decremented some number, 
then add ten to number1 in column1 and row1. 
Before the ADD-TEN rule can apply, the system must first apply the DECREMENT 
rule. This matches in cases where the system has shifted its focus of attention away from 
the column currently being processed (1, 2), and the top number in the new column is 
greater than zero (3, 4, 5). Upon firing, the rule decrements the top number by one and 
returns the focus of attention to the column immediately to the right (6). A negated 
condition (7) prevents DECREMENT from applying more than once in a given situation. 
DECREMENT 
If you are focusing on column1, 
but you are not processing column1, 
and number1 is in column1 and row1, 
and row1 is above row2, 
and number1 is greater than zero, 
and column1 is left of column2, 
and you have not just decremented a number, 
then decrement number1 by one in column1 and row1, 
and note that you have just decremented a number, 
and note that you are focusing on column2. 
However, before the system can decrement the top number in a column, it must first be 
focused on that column. The rule SHIFT-LEFT-TO-BORROW takes the first step in this 
direction, matching in precisely those cases in which borrowing is required. In other words, 
the rule applies if the system is focused on the column it is currently processing (1, 2), if 
that column contains two numbers (3, 5), if the bottom one larger than the top one (4, 6), 
and if there is another column to the left (7) from which to borrow. A negated condition 
(8) keeps this rule from matching if DECREMENT has just applied, thus avoiding and 
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infinite loop. Under these conditions, SHIFT-LEFT-TO-BORROW shifts the focus of 
attention to the adjacent column. 
SHIFT-LEFT-TO-BORROW 
If you are focused on column1, 
and you are processing column1, 
and number 1 is in column1 and row1, 
and number2 is in column1 and row2, 
and row1 is above row2, 
and number2 is greater than number1, 
and column2 is left of column1, 
and you have not just decremented a number, 
then note that you are focusing on column2. 
For many borrowing problems (such as 654 - 278), the SHIFT-LEFT-TO-BORROW 
rule is quite sufficient, since one can borrow from the column immediately to the left of the 
one being processed. However, if the column to the left contains a zero as its top number, 
one must search further. The rule SHIFT-LEFT-ACROSS-ZERO handles cases such as 
these, matching if the system has shifted its focus of attention (1, 2), if it has found a 
zero (3) in the top row (4) of the new column, and if there is another column to the left 
(5). When these conditions are met, the rule shifts attention to the column immediately 
to the left. Again, this will not occur if DECREMENT was just applied (6), since this 
would cause an infinite loop. On problems involving multiple zeros in the top row (such as 
10005 - 6), SHIFT-LEFT-ACROSS-ZERO will apply as many times as necessary to reach 
a number which it can decrement. 
SHIFT-LEFT-ACROSS-ZERO 
If you are focused on column1, 
and you are not processing column1, 
and the number in column1 and row1 is zero, 
and row1 is above row2, 
and column2 is left of column1, 
and you did not just decrement a number, 
then note that you are focusing on column2. 
The above rules handle the major work involved in multi-column subtraction, but the 
system must also have some way to know when it has completed solving a given problem. 
The rule FINISHED is responsible for noting when there is no longer a blank (3) in the 
result position of the left-most column (1, 2). In such cases, this rule fires and tells the 
production system to halt, since it has generated a complete answer to the problem. 
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FINISHED 
If you are processing column1, 
and there is no column2 to the left of column1, 
and the result of column1 is not blank, 
then you are finished. 
A Simple Subtraction Problem 
Now that we have examined each of the rules in our system, let us consider its behavior 
on some specific subtraction problems. Presented with the problem 87 - 31, the system 
begins with the problem representation we described earlier.3 This consists of 10 basic 
working memory elements: 
(8 in column-2 row-1) 
(7 in column-1 row-1) 
(3 in column-2 row-2) 
(1 in column-1 row-2) 
(processing column-1) 
(focused-on column-1) 
(blank result-for column-2) 
(blank result-for column-1) 
(column-2 left-of column-1) 
(row-1 above row-2) 
We are assuming here that greater-than relations are tested by LISP predicates rather 
than being explicitly represented in memory, while the relations above and left-of are 
stored directly. Note that the rightmost column (column-1) is labeled for processing first, 
and that this column is also the initial focus of attention. 
Given this information, the rule FIND-DIFFERENCE matches against the elements 
(processing column-1), (7 in column-1 row-1), (1 in column-1 row-2), (row-1 above row-2), 
and (7 greater-than 1). The action side of this production is instantiated, computing the 
difference between 7 and 1, and the number 6 is "written" in the results column. This last 
action is represented by the new element (6 result-for column-1). 
Now that there is a result in the current column,_the rule SHIFT-COLUMN matches 
against the elements (processing column-1), (focused-on column-1), and (column-2 left-
of column-I). Although this production has four conditions, only the first, second, and 
third are matched, since the third is a negated condition that must not be met. Upon 
application, the rule removes the elements (processing column-1) and (focused-on column-
1) from memory, and adds the elements (processing column-2) and (focused-on column-2). 
In other words, having finished with the first column, the system now moves on to the 
3 This representation may be provided directly by the programmer, or it may be gen-
erated automatically by the system from linear input, using another set of rules. In any 
case, we will ignore this preprocessing stage to keep our example as simple as possible. 
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adjacent one. 
At this point, the conditions of FIND-DIFFERENCE are again met, though this time 
they match against a different set of elements - (processing column-2), (8 in column-2 
row-1), (3 in column-2 row-2), (row-1 above row-2), and (8 greater-than 3). As before, the 
rule computes the difference of the two digits, and adds the element (5 result-for column-2) 
to working memory. The presence of this new element serves to trigger the conditions of 
FINISHED, since both columns now have answers. Having generated a complete answer 
to the problem (56), the system halts. 
A Complex Subtraction Problem 
Since the above problem involved no borrowing, we saw only a few of the rules in 
action, so let us now turn to the more difficult problem 305 - 29. At the outset of this 
task, working memory contains the following elements: 
(blank in column-5 row-2) 
(3 in column-5 row-1) 
( column-5 left-of column-4) 
(2 in column-4 row-2) 
(0 in column-4 row-1) 
(column-4 left-of column-3) 
(9 in column-3 row-2) 
(5 in column-3 row-1) 
(focused-on column".'3) 
(processing column-3) 
(row-1 above row-2) 
If we measure complexity by the number of elements in memory, this problem is only 
slightly more complex than our first example. However, the manner in which these elements 
interact with the various productions leads to significantly more processing than in the 
earlier case. 
As before, the system begins by attempting to process the rightmost column. Since the 
greater-than condition of FIND-DIFFERENCE is not met (5 is not greater than 9), this 
rule can not apply immediately. Instead, the production SHIFT-LEFT-TO-BORROW 
matches, and shifts the focus of attention to the column to the left (column-3). On 
many borrowing problems, the system would apply DECREMENT at this point, but the 
conditions of this rule are not met either (zero is not greater than zero). However, the 
conditions of SHIFT-LEFT-ACROSS-ZERO are met, and this leads to system to move its 
focus even further left, to column-5. 
Finally the system has reached a column in which it can apply DECREMENT, and 
in doing so it replaces the element (3 in column-5 row-1) with the element (2 in column-5 
row-1). This rule also moves the focus back one column to the right, making column-4 the 
center of attention. Given this new situation, ADD-TEN matches and the 0 in the middle 
column is replaced with the "digit" 10. This is accomplished by replacing the element (0 
9 
in column-4 row-1) with the new element (10 in column-4 row-1). 
Now that the system has a number larger than zero in the middle column, it can decre-
ment this number as well. The DECREMENT production matches against the current 
state of memory, replacing the recently generated 10 with the digit 9. In addition, the 
rule shifts the focus of attention from the middle column (column-4) back to the rightmost 
column (column-3). Since the system has just decremented a number in the adjacent col-
umn, the rule ADD-TEN now replaces the 5 in the rightmost column with the "digit" 15. 
This in turn allows FIND-DIFFERENCE to apply, since the number in the top row of this 
column is now larger than the number in the bottom row. The effect is that the difference 
6 (that is, 15 - 9) is added as the result for column-3. 
The presence of a result in the current column causes SHIFT-COLUMN to match, and 
both the processing marker and the focus of attention are shifted to the center column. 
Since the top number in this column is larger than the bottom number (from our earlier 
borrowing), FIND-DIFFERENCE matches and computes 9 - 2. The resulting difference 7 
is "written" as the result for the middle column, and this in turn leads SHIFT-COLUMN 
to fire again, shifting processing and attention to the rightmost column. 
In this case the bottom row of the current column is blank, so the only matched 
production is FIND-TOP. This rule decides that the result for the rightmost column should 
be 2 (the digit in the top row), and since all columns now have associated results, the rule 
FINISHED applies and the system halts, having computed the correct answer of 276. 
Comments on Subtraction 
Although we hope that our program for subtraction has given the reader a better feel 
for the nature of production system models, it is important to note that it makes one 
major simplification. Since only one rule (and only one instantiation of each rule) matches 
at any given time, we were able to ignore the issue of conflict resolution. Although this 
was useful for instructional purposes, the reader should know that there are very few tasks 
for which it is possible to model behavior in such a carefully crafted manner, and conflict 
resolution has an important role to play in these cases. 
Our choice of subtraction as an example gives us some initial insight into the advantages 
of this framework, which we consider in more detail below. Brown & Burton (1978) and 
Brown & VanLehn (1980) have made significant strides in classifying children's subtraction 
errors, and in accounting for these errors using their "repair theory". However, Young 
& O'Shea (1981) have proposed an alternative model of subtraction errors based on a 
production system analysis. They account for many of the observed errors by omitting 
certain rules from a model of correct behavior. Langley & Ohlsson (1984) have taken this 
approach further, accounting for errors only in terms of incorrect conditions on the rules 
shown above. Within this framework, they have developed a system that automatically 
constructs a model to account for observed errors. This is possible only because of the 
inherent modularity of production system programs. 
Before closing, we should point out one other feature of the production system ap-
proach - it does not completely constrain the systems one constructs, any more than other 
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computer programming languages. For example, Anderson (1983) has presented a pro-
duction system model of multi-column addition that is organized quite differently from 
our subtraction system, despite the similarity of the two tasks. The point is that there is 
considerable room for different "programming styles" within the production system frame-
work, since people can employ quite different representations and control structures. Thus, 
Anderson's model makes heavy use of explicit goals that are held in working memory; our 
"processing" and "focus" elements play a similar role, but organize behavior in a different 
fashion. 
Advantages of Production System Models 
Now that we have seen an example of a production system model, it is appropriate to 
consider the advantages of this approach. The fact that production systems allow one to 
carry out subtraction or any other behavior is not sufficient - most programming languages 
are equivalent in computational power. However, Newell & Simon (1972) have argued that 
production systems have a number of features that recommend them for modeling human 
behavior. Let us recount some of these characteristics: 
• Homogeneity. Production systems represent knowledge in a very homogeneous format, 
with each rule having the same basic structure and carrying approximately the same 
amount of information. This makes them much easier to handle than traditional fl.ow 
diagram models. 
• Independence. Production rules are relatively independent of each other, making it 
easy to insert new rules or remove old ones. This makes them very useful for modeling 
successive stages in a developmental sequence, and also makes them attractive for 
modeling the incremental nature of much human learning. 
• Parallel/serial nature. Production systems combine the notion of a parallel recognition 
process with a serial application process; both features seem to be characteristic of 
human cognition. 
• Stimulus-response flavor. Production systems inherit many of the benefits of stimulus-
response theory, but few of the limitations, since the notions of stimuli and responses 
have been extended to include internal symbol structures. 
• Goal-driven behavior. Production systems can also be used to model the goal-driven 
character of much human behavior. However, such behavior need not be rigidly en-
forced; new information from the environment can interrupt processing of the current 
goal. 
• Modeling memory. The production system framework offers a viable model of long-
term memory and its relation to short-term memory, since the matching and conflict 
resolution process embody principles of retrieval and focus of attention. 
Taken together, the above features suggest the production system approach as a useful 
framework within which to construct models of human beh~vior. Of course, this does not 
mean that production systems are the only such framework, but there seems sufficient 
promise to pursue the approach vigorously. 
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As we will shortly see in the historical section, production systems have been used 
successfully to model human behavior on a wide range of tasks. As we will also see, 
Newell & Simon's initial ideas on the nature of the human cognitive architecture have 
been revised along many dimensions, and many additional revisions will undoubtedly be 
required before we achieve significant understanding of human learning and performance. 
This observation leads us back to the issue of viewing production systems as cognitive 
architectures, to which we now turn. 
Production Systems as Cognitive Architectures 
The term "cognitive architecture" denotes the invariant features of the human informa-
tion processing system. Since one of the major goals of any science is to uncover invariants, 
the search for the human cognitive architecture should be a central concern of cognitive 
psychology. The decision to pursue production system models involves making significant 
assumptions about the nature of this architecture, but within the boundaries defined by 
these assumptions there remains a large space of possibilities. 
In later chapters, we will see many different instantiations of the basic production sys-
tem framework, but let us anticipate some of these variations by considering the dimensions 
along which production system architectures may differ: 
• Working memory issues: 
o The structure of memory. Is there a single general working memory, or multiple 
specialized memories (such as data and goal memories)? In the latter case, which 
are matched against by production memory? 
o The structure of elements. What is the basic form of working memory elements 
(e.g., list structures, attribute-value pairs)? Do elements have associated numeric 
parameters, such as activation or recency? 
o Decay and forgetting. Are there limits on the number of items present in working 
memory? If so, are these time-based or space-based limitations? 
o Retrieval processes. Once they have been "forgotten", can elements be retrieved at 
some later date? If so, what processes lead to such retrieval? E.g., must productions 
add them to memory, or does "spreading activation" occur? 
• Production memory issues: 
o The structure of memory. Is there a single general production memory, or are there 
many specialized memories? In the latter case, are all memories at the same level, 
or are their organized hierarchically? 
o The structure of productions. Do productions have associated numeric parameters 
(e.g., strength and recency) or other information beyond conditions and actions? 
o Expressive power of conditions. What types of conditions can be used to determine 
whether a rule is applicable? E.g., can arbitrary predicates be included? Can sets 
or sequences be matched against? Can many-to-one mappings occur? 
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o Expressive power of actions. What kind of processing can be performed within the 
action side of an individual rule? E.g., can arbitrary functions be evoked? Can 
conditional expressions occur? 
o Nature of the match process. Are exact matches required or is partial matching 
allowed? Does the matcher find all matched rules, or only some of them? Does the 
matcher find all instantiations of a given production? 
• Conflict resolution issues: 
o Ordering strategies. How does the architecture order instantiations of productions? 
E.g., does it use the recency of matched elements or the specificity of the matched 
rules? 
o Selection strategies. How does the architecture select instantiations based on this 
ordering? E.g., does it select the best instantiation, or does it select all those above 
a certain threshold? 
o Refraction strategies. Does the architecture remove some instantiations perma-
nently? E.g., it may remove all instantiations that applied on the last cycle, or all 
instantiations currently in the conflict set. 
• Self-modification issues: 
o Learning mechanisms. What are the basic learning mechanisms that lead to new 
productions? Examples are generalization, discrimination, composition, procedu-
ralization, and strengthening. 
o Conditions for learning. What are the conditions under which these learning mech-
anisms are evoked? E.g., whenever an error is noted, or whenever a rule is applied? 
o Interactions between mechanisms. Do the learning mechanisms complement each 
other, or do they compete for control of behavior? E.g., generalization and dis-
crimination move in opposite directions through the space of conditions. 
To summarize, the basic production system framework has many possible incarnations, 
each with different implications about the nature of human cognition. The. relevance of 
these issues to enduring questions in the psychology of learning and development should 
be obvious. The chapters in this volume represent only a small sample from the space 
of possible architectures, although they include many of the self-modifying production 
systems that have been proposed to date. Before elaborating some of the issues involved 
with the formulation of learning systems, we will digress slightly in order to establish some 
historical context for production systems. 
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The History of Production System Models 
Although they have their roots in the formalisms of computer science and mathemat-
ics, the relevance of production systems to psychology began some 20 years ago, when 
Newell (1967) first proposed them as one way to formulate information processing theories 
of human problem solving behavior. Their initial use was to provide theoretical accounts 
of human performance on a variety of tasks, ranging from adults' behavior on various puz-
zles (Newell & Simon, 1972) to children's responses to class-inclusion questions (Klahr & 
Wallace, 1972). However, it soon became apparent that they were eminently well suited 
for dealing with issues of development (Klahr & Wallace, 1973; 1976) and learning (An-
derson, Kline & Beasley, 1978; Anzai & Simon, 1979; Langley, Neches, Neves & Anzai, 
1980). Below we review the history of these efforts, including specific models and general 
production system architectures. 
Specific Production Systems Models 
The early production system models were not implemented on a computer and required 
"hand simulation" in order to determine their consequences. The first running production 
system appears to have been Waterman's {1970) poker playing program. It is interesting 
to note that this was also a learning system, though it was not an attempt to model the 
human learning process. 
Soon thereafter, Newell (1972) described the implementation of a general purpose 
production system interpreter (called PSG) that could be applied to a wide range of 
cognitive domains. Newell's first two applications of PSG were atypical of the subsequent 
use of production systems; the first (Newell, 1972) focused on stimulus encoding, while the 
second (Newell, 1973) modeled performance on the Sternberg memory scanning paradigm. 
Both papers presented a much finer grained analysis than the majority of production 
system models have employed. Klahr's (1973) model of basic quantification processes was 
also designed to account for very fine-grained encoding processes. 
A few years later, Waterman (1975) reported new results with adaptive production sys-
tems. One of these systems implemented EPAM-like discrimination networks as production 
rules, and another focused on sequence extrapolation tasks. Again, neither was intended 
as a cognitive simulation, but both were interesting in their adaptive characteristics. One 
year later, Rychener (1976) completed a thesis in which he reimplemented a variety of well-
known AI systems as production systems. This work convincingly demonstrated that the 
production system framework was as powerful as other existing representational schemes, 
and that it was a useful framework for implementing complex models of intelligence. 
Anderson, Kline & Lewis (1977) went on to use production systems to model the 
complexities of natural language understanding, and Anderson (1976) also applied the ap-
proach to a variety of other information processing tasks. Thibadeau, Just & Carpenter 
(1982) went even further, showing how production system models could account for reac-
tion time phenomena in reading tasks. Finally, Ohlsson {1980b) employed the production 
system framework to model detailed verbal protocols on transitive reasoning tasks. Since 
1980, the use of production systems in modeling human performance has spread, but since 
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performance is not our central concern, let us turn our attention to other matters. 
In addition to Waterman's early concern with learning, a number of early researchers 
employed production systems in modeling cognitive development. However, rather than 
develop models of the transition process at the outset, they instead constructed models of 
behavior at successive developmental stages. Klahr & Wallace (1973, 1976) carried out the 
earliest work of this type, constructing stage models of behavior on a variety of Piagetian 
tasks, including class inclusion and conservation of quantity. The basic approach involved 
modeling behavior at different stages in terms of production system programs that differed 
by only one or a few rules. 
Baylor, Gascon, Lemoyne & Pother (1973) extended this approach to Piagetian length 
and weight seriation tasks, and Young (1976) carried out an even more detailed analysis of 
length seriation in his thesis research. Klahr & Siegler (1978) developed similar production 
system stage models for Piaget's balance scale task, combining this with detailed empirical 
studies of children's behavior on the task. Larkin (1981) used a comparable framework 
to model adult expert-novice differences in physics problem solving, and Ohlsson (1980a) 
modeled similar differences in ability on his transitive reasoning tasks. 
These stage models were tantalizing, in that they explained behavioral differences at 
successive stages in terms of slightly different rule sets, and yet provided no mechanisms 
to account for the transition process. (The work by Klahr & Wallace did eventually lead 
to a transition model, as we will see in Chapter 8.) After Waterman's early forays, the 
first truly adaptive production system models were reported by Anderson, Kline & Beasley 
(1978); these employed mechanisms of generalization, discrimination, and strengthening, 
about which we will hear more later in the chapter by Langley. 
Shortly thereafter, production system models of learning became an active research 
area. For instance, Anzai (1978) reported a model of human learning on the Tower of 
Hanoi puzzle, and Neves (1978) proposed a model of algebra learning. At about the same 
time, Langley (1978) developed an adaptive production system for concept attainment, se-
quence extrapolation, and simple empirical discovery, while McDermott (1979) described 
a production system approach to reasoning by analogy. (However, neither Langley nor 
McDermott's systems were concerned with modeling human behavior in any detail.) Fi-
nally, Lewis (1978) introduced the mechanism of composition, which he describes in more 
detail in Chapter 7. 
Research on adaptive production systems continued into the 1980's, with Neves & 
Anderson (1981) extending Lewis' notion of composition and introducing the mechanism 
of proceduralization. Neches (1981a, 1981b) took a quite different approach in his theory 
of strategy transformation (see Chapter 4), and Newell & Rosenbloom (1981) proposed a 
theory of learning by chunking (see Chapter 5). Since then, research in production system 
models of learning has continued unabated, and many of the researchers in the new field 
of machine learning have taken a closely related approach.4 In the following chapters, we 
will examine some of this work in more detail. 
4 For instance, nearly all work on heuristics learning has represented procedures in terms 
of condition-action rules or productions. 
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Research on Production System Architectures 
Our treatment of production systems would not be complete without some discussion of 
the history and development of production system architectures and their implementations 
as programming languages. Upon examining the history of research on production systems, 
one is struck by an obvious trend - nearly every researcher who has developed production 
system models of significant complexity has developed his own architecture and associated 
language. However, many of these architectures are very similar, and it is worthwhile to 
trace their evolution over time. Figure 1 summarizes this evolutionary process. 
The first widely-used production system programming language was PSG (Newell & 
McDermott, 1975). Rather than embodying a single architecture, PSG provided a number 
of parameters that defined an entire class of architectures. Thus the modeler could explore 
different memory limitations, alternative conflict resolution schemes, and similar issues. 
However, PSG did assume a "queue" model of working memory, with elements stored in 
an ordered list. Many of the early production system models were implemented in PSG, 
including Newell's (1973) model of the Sternberg phenomenon and Klahr & Wallace's 
(1976) developmental stage models. 
Another early production system language was Waterman's PAS. This was not in-
tended as a serious model of the human cognitive architecture,5 but it did have some 
primitive learning capabilities. Conflict resolution was based on the order of productions, 
and working memory was stored as a queue. Ohlsson (1979) developed a similar pro-
duction system language called PSS, which he used in his models of transitive reasoning. 
This was very similar to PAS in that it used production order for conflict resolution and a 
queue-based model of short-term memory; however, one could also divide production rules 
into a number of sets that were organized hierarchically. 
Rychener's PSNLST (1976) incorporated a number of novel features. First, the main 
conflict resolution method was based on recency, with preference being given to instantia-
tions that matched against more recent elements. Rychener used this bias to ensure that 
subgoals were addressed in the desired order. Second, PSNLST dynamically reordered 
productions according to the number of times they had been placed on the candidate 
match list. This led the architecture to prefer rules that had recently shown promise, and 
had a quite different flavor from the static ordering schemes that had prevailed in earlier 
languages. 
The history of production systems took another significant turn when Forgy & McDer-
mott (1976) developed the first version of OPS. This language was the vehicle of the In-
structable Production System project at Carnegie-Mellon University, led by Allen Newell. 
The most important feature of OPS was its pattern matcher, which allowed it to effi-
ciently compute the matched instantiations of all productions. This in turn made possible 
experiments with different conflict resolution strategies, and made the notion of refraction 
tractable. OPS also assumed a working memory of unlimited size, with the associated the-
5 However, PAS aided the cognitive simulation effort indirectly, since Waterman & 
Newell (1972) used it to construct a semi-automatic system for analyzing verbal protocols. 
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oretical claim that human memory only appeared limited due to a recency-based conflict 
resolution scheme (similar to that used by PSNLST). 
Forgy's initial version of OPS was followed by OPS2 (1977) and OPS4 (1979a), which 
were minor variations implemented in different programming languages. By OPS4, the 
basic conflict resolution strategies had stabilized, with refraction given first priority, fol-
lowed by recency of the matched elements and specificity of the rules. Rychener's (1980) 
OPS3 was a descendant of OPS2 that stored elements in terms of attribute-value pairs in 
an effort to provide greater representational flexibility. 
: OPS6 
Figure 1. Development of production system architectures. 
The next incarnation, OPSS (Forgy, 1981), also used an attribute-value scheme, but 
in a much less flexible manner than OPS3 did. However, the main goal of OPSS was 
efficiency, and along this dimension it succeeded admirably. Over the years, it has become 
one of the most widely used AI languages for implementing expert systems, but it was 
never intended as a serious model of the human cognitive architecture. We direct the 
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reader to Brownston, Farrell, Kant, & Martin (1985) for an excellent tutorial in OPS5 
programming techniques. More recently, Forgy (1984) has developed OPS83, a production 
system language with many of the features of PASCAL, making it an even less plausible 
cognitive model than was OPS5 (though again, this was not its goal). 
Although never implemented, OPS6 (Rosenbloom & Forgy, personal communication) 
included a number of ambitious ideas. For instance, both lists and sets were to be supported 
as basic data structures in both working memory elements and productions. In addition, 
multiple working memories and production memories were to be allowed, each having 
its own sub-architectural characteristics. This flexibility was in direct contrast to the 
restrictions imposed for the sake of efficiency in OPS5. 
In parallel with the work at C-MU, Anderson and his colleagues at Yale were devel-
oping ACTE (1976), a production system framework that was intended to model human 
behavior. This architecture included two declarative repositories - a long-term memory 
and an "active" memory that was a subset of the first. Productions matched only against 
elements in active memory, but these could be retrieved from long-term memory through 
a process of spreading activation. Conflict resolution was tied to the strength and speci-
ficity of rules, and to the activation levels of the matched elements; moreover, the final 
selection of instantiations was probabilistic. Its successor was ACTF (Anderson, Kline & 
Beasley, 1978), an architecture that included mechanisms for learning through generaliza-
tion, discrimination, and strengthening of rules. Methods for learning by composition and 
proceduralization were added later (Neves & Anderson, 1981). 
When Anderson moved to Carnegie-Mellon University in 1979, a new generation of 
languages began to evolve that incorporated Forgy's matcher. Two architectures - ACTG 
and ACTH - existed only in transitory form, but these were followed by GRAPES (Sauers 
_& Farrell, 1982), a production system language that placed goals in a special memory. 
Methods for learning by composition and proceduralization were also included in GRAPES, 
and were closely linked to the processing of goal structures. 
Concurrently with the GRAPES effort, Anderson (1983) developed ACT*, apparently 
the final installment in the ACT series of architectures. This framework employed the 
notion of excitation and inhibition among the conditions of various productions, and im-
plemented a partial matching scheme based on a variant of Forgy's matcher. ACT* also 
employed three forms of declarative representation - list structures (like those used in 
most production systems), spatial structures, and temporally ordered lists. The architec-
ture also supported a variety of learning methods carried over from ACTF, though the 
notion of spreading activation differed considerably from earlier versions. 
The short-lived ACTG was developed by Langley, but a collaboration with Neches led 
to PRISM (Langley & Neches, 1981), a production system language that supported a class 
of cognitive architectures in the same spirit as PSG. PRISM incorporated some features 
of OPS4, ACTF, and HPM (Neches, this volume), including two declarative memories, 
mechanisms for spreading activation, and methods for learning by discrimination, gener-
alization, and strengthening. Since it employed the OPS4 matcher, the language provided 
considerable flexibility in conflict resolution. Based on the PRISM code, Thibadeau (1982) 
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developed CAPS, an activation-based architecture that employed a notion of thresholds 
and allowed rules to fire in parallel. 
PRISM's major limitation was the large number of unstructured parameters used 
to specify a given architecture. In response, the researchers developed PRISM2 {Lang-
ley, Ohlsson, Thibadeau & Walter, 1984), which organized architectures around a set of 
schemas, each with a few associated parameters. This language was strongly influenced by 
the Rosenbloom & Forgy OPS6 design, and allowed arbitrary sets of declarative and pro-
duction memories, each with its own characteristics (such as decay functions and conflict 
resolution schemes). 
Rosenbloom's interest in motor behavior led to XAPS {1979) and XAPS2 {this vol-
ume), architectures that allowed parallel application of productions. The first of these 
was activation-based, while the distinguishing feature of the second was its method for 
learning by chunking. Laird {1983) developed SOAR, an architecture that combined the 
production system framework with Newell's {1980) problem space hypothesis. Finally, 
Laird, Rosenbloom & Newell {1984) reported SOAR2, an architecture that combined the 
problem solving features of SOAR with the chunking abilities of XAPS2. 
We have attempted to summarize the developmental influences among these architec-
tures in Figure 1. For instance, the sequence of OPS languages descended directly from 
one another, though OPS3 and OPS4 should be viewed as co-existing rather than as parent 
and child. ACTF and OPS4 were the main influences on the initial version of PRISM, 
while PRISM2 derived from PRISM and the OPS6 design. We have not attempted to give 
an exhaustive treatment here. However, the architectures we have reviewed seem {to us) to 
be the mainstream of production system research, and most of the architectures described 
in this volume can be traced back to one of the frameworks we have described. 
The Nature of Learning 
The term "learning" is similar to the term "art", in that it is very difficult to generate a 
satisfactory definition of either term.6 Learning is clearly a multi-faceted phenomenon that 
covers a variety of quite different behaviors. Perhaps the most commonly accepted "def-
inition" is that learning is "the improvement of performance over time". However, other 
researchers view learning as "increased understanding", while still others view learning as 
involving "data compression" or the summarization of experience. 
Examples of Learning 
Rather than attempt to define such an ambiguous term, let us consider some examples 
of learning "tasks" that have been discussed in the literature of cognitive psychology and 
artificial intelligence. The most common of these is the task of "learning from examples", in 
which one is presented with positive and negative instances of some concept, and attempts 
· to formulate some general description that covers the positive instances but none of the 
negative instances. For this class of tasks, improvement consists of increasing one's ability 
6 Bundy {1984) discusses the difficulties of defining "learning" in some detail. 
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to correctly predict exemplars and non-exemplars of the concept. Chapter 3 gives a fuller 
treatment of this problem, which has a long history within both psychology and AI. In 
many ways, this is the simplest of the learning tasks that has been studied (Winston, 1975; 
Hayes-Roth & McDermott, 1978; Anderson & Kline, 1979; Michalski, 1980). 
A more complex task is that of "learning search heuristics", in which one is presented 
with a set of problems that require search in order to find the solution. After suitable 
practice on these tasks, the learner is expected to acquire heuristics that reduce or eliminate 
the search he must carry out in solving the problems. This task has received considerable 
attention within AI in recent years, and is also discussed in greater detail in Chapters 
2 and 3. The vast majority of work in this area has been within the production system 
framework (Brazdil, 1978; Neves, 1978; Langley, 1983; Mitchell, Utgoff & Banerji, 1983), 
though only a few researchers have attempted to model human learning in this domain 
(Anzai, 1978; Ohlsson, 1983). 
In the heuristics learning task, the notion of improvement involves a reduction in 
search. On another class of procedural learning tasks, improvement consists of reduction 
in the amount of time required to carry out an algorithmic procedure. Chapters 4, 5, 
and 7 all focus on how such speedup effects can result from practice. In general, the 
mechanisms proposed to account for speedup have been quite different from those posited 
to account for reduced search (Lewis, 1978; Neches, 1981a; Neves & Anderson, 1981). 
However, Laird, Rosenbloom & Newell (1984) have recently outlined a production system 
theory that accounts for both using the same mechanism. 
The task of language acquisition has also received considerable attention, though most 
work in this area has focused on the subproblem of grammar learning (Hedrick, 1976; 
Berwick, 1979; Anderson, 1981; Langley, 1982). In this task, the learner hears grammatical 
sentences from the language to be acquired, together with the meanings of those sentences.7 
The goal is to generate rules for mapping sentences onto their meanings, or meanings onto 
grammatical sentences. In the grammar learning task, improvement involves generating 
ever closer approximations to the adult grammar. This task is described in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
The final class of tasks we will consider (though we have not attempted to be exhaus-
tive) is that of cognitive development. Obviously, this term covers considerable ground, but 
in this context we assume a fairly specific meaning. Cognitive developmental researchers 
have studied children's behavior on a variety of tasks, many originally invented by Piaget. 
There is considerable evidence that children progress through identifiable stages on each 
of these tasks, and one would like some theory to account for this progression. In this 
case, improvement consists of changes that lead toward adult behavior on a given task. 
Relatively few learning models have been proposed to account for these data, but we will 
see two of them in Chapters 3 and 8. 
In addition to accounting for improvement, models of human learning should also 
account for side effects of the learning process. For example, one effect of speedup seems 
7 Typically, these are presented as sentence-meaning pairs, though it is theoretically 
assumed that the child must infer the meanings from context. 
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to be a lack of flexibility in the resulting procedure. Neves & Anderson (1981) have shown 
that such phenomena arise naturally from their composition model of speedup, leading to 
Einstellung in problem solving behavior. The list of such successful predictions is small, 
but at this stage in the development of our science, even theories that account for the fact 
of improvement must be considered major advances. 
The reader may have noted that we have focused on learning from experience, as 
opposed to learning from instruction or learning by deduction. Similarly, we have focused 
on the acquisition of procedures, rather than the acquisition of declarative knowledge. This 
reflects a bias of the editors, and this bias is reflected in the following chapters (the chapter 
by Wallace, Klahr, and Bluff is the exception, addressing non-procedural issues). We will 
not attempt to justify this bias, for certainly non-procedural, non-experiential learning is 
equally a part of the human condition and must ultimately be included in any integrated 
model of human behavior. However, we should note that our emphasis on procedural, 
experience-based learning reflects current trends in cognitive science and AI, so we feel our 
bias is representative of these fields. 
Components of Learning 
Now that we have examined some examples of learning tasks, let us turn to_ some 
common features of these tasks. In particular, within any task that involves learning from 
experience, one can identify four component problems that must be addressed.8 These 
components are: 
• Aggregation. The learner must identify the basic objects that constitute the instances 
from which he will learn. In other words, he must identify the part-of relations, or 
determine the appropriate chunks. 
• Clustering. The learner must identify which objects or events should be grouped to-
gether into a class. In other words, he must identify the instance-of relations, or 
generate an extensional definition of the concept. 
• Characterization The learner must formulate some general description or hypothesis 
that characterizes instances of the concept. In other words, he must generate an 
intensional definition of the concept.9 
• Storage/Indexing. The learner must store the characterization in some manner that 
lets him retrieve it, as well as make use of the retrieved knowledge. 
We would argue that any system that learns from experience must address each of these 
four issues, even if the responses to some are degenerate. In fact, we will see that many of 
the traditional learning tasks allow one to ignore some of the components, making them 
idealizations of the general task of learning from experience. 
8 Fisher & Langley (1985) have used some of these components to analyze methods for 
"conceptual clustering", while Easterlin & Langley (1985) have examined their role in 
concept formation. 
9 This is often called the "generalization" problem, but since this word has an ambiguous 
meaning, we will avoid its use here. 
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For instance, the task of learning from examples can be viewed as a degenerate case of 
the general learning task, in that the tutor solves the aggregation and clustering problems 
by providing the learner with positive and negative instances of the concept to be learned. 
In addition, since only one (or at most a few) concept(s) must be acquired, there is no 
need to index them in any sophisticated manner - a simple list is quite sufficient. Thus, 
the task of learning from examples can be viewed as "distilled" characterization, since this 
is the only component of learning that must be addressed. This simplification has proven 
quite useful to learning researchers, and many of the characterization methods that were 
initially developed for the task of learning from examples have been successfully transferred 
to more complex problems. 
Similarly, the task of heuristics learning ignores the issue of aggregation, assuming that 
individual problem states constitute the objects upon which learning should be based.10 
However, methods for heuristics learning must directly respond to the clustering issue, 
since no tutor is available to identify positive and negative instances. In fact, within the 
framework of learning search heuristics, the clustering problem is identical to the well-
known problem of credit and blame assignment. Methods for heuristics learning must also 
address the characterization problem, since one must generate some general description of 
the situations under which each operator should be applied. Finally, the storage issue has 
generally been ignored in research on heuristics learning, since relatively small numbers of 
operators have been involved. 
Many of the models of speedup involve some form of chunking, and this approach can 
be viewed as another variant on the general task of learning from experience. In this 
case, the structure to be learned is some sequential or spatial configuration of perceptions 
or actions. Unlike the tasks of learning from examples and heuristics learning, chunking 
tasks force one to directly address the aggregation issue, since one must decide which 
components to include as parts of the higher level structure. However, in most chunking 
methods, the characterization problem is made trivial, since new rules are based directly 
on existing rules, for which the level of generality is already known. Also, even in methods 
that address issues of characterization, chunks are based on single instances, so that the 
clustering problem is also bypassed. 
Finally, the grammar learning task can be viewed a fourth variant on the general 
problem of learning from experience. Like the chunking task, it forces one to respond 
to the problem of aggregation, since it must form sequential structures such as "noun 
phrase" and "verb phrase". Like the heuristics learning task, it requires one to address 
the clustering problem, since it must group words into disjunctive classes like "noun" and 
"verb" without the aid of a tutor. It also forces one to deal with characterization issues, 
though in some approaches, the set of chunks in which a class like "noun" occurs can 
be viewed characterization of that class. Storage is also a significant issue in grammar 
· learning, since many rules may be required to summarize even a small grammar. 
10 As we will see in Chapter 3, this is not completely true, but it has been true of the 
majority of work on learning search heuristics. 
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It is interesting to note that production system models of learning sometimes provide 
their own answer to the storage/indexing problem, since the conditions of productions can 
be efficiently stored in a discrimination network that both reduces space requirements and 
speeds up the matching process. Forgy (1982) has described this storage scheme in some 
detail and many of the models described in this book rely on Forgy's approach. Thus, one 
can argue that within the production system framework, only the issues of aggregation, 
clustering, and characterization must be addressed. Although some readers may disagree 
with this assumption, most of the chapters in this volume adopt it either implicitly or 
explicitly. 
Mechanisms of Learning 
In the preceding sections, we considered the learning phenomena that require explana-
tion, followed by the components of learning that any model must address. In this section, 
we consider various mechanisms that have been proposed to account for the learning pro-
cess, both in the following chapters and elsewhere in the literature. 
Within the production system framework, the nature of the recognize-act cycle con-
strains the points at which learning can have an effect. There are three such choice-points; 
a production system's repertoire of behaviors can be changed by affecting the outcome of: 
• the process of matching productions 
• the process of conflict resolution 
• the process of applying productions 
Let us examine different mechanisms that have been proposed in terms of the manner in 
which they affect the recognize-act cycle. 
The most obvious way to affect the set of applicable productions found by the matching 
process is to add new productions to the set. However, this makes certain assumptions: 
matching must either be exhaustive, or the new production must be added in such a way 
that guarantees it will be considered by the matcher. Waterman's (1970, 1975) early work 
took the latter approach, adding new rules above those productions they were intended 
to mask (since rules were matched in a linear order). The work on stage models of de-
velopment (Young, 1976) employed similar methods. After Forgy (1979b) presented an 
efficient method for computing all matched instantiations, the exhaustive scheme became 
more popular. 
The earliest approach to creating new rules employed a production-building command 
in the action side of productions. This function took an arbitrary condition-action form 
as its argument, and whenever the rule containing it was applied, it would instantiate 
the form and add a new rule to production memory. Of course, simple instantiations of 
a general form are not very interesting, but one could use other productions to construct 
more useful rules which were then passed to the production-building rule. The OPS family 
of architectures called this function build, while the ACT family used the term designate. 
Although this method was quite popular in the early work on adaptive productions, it has 
now been largely replaced by other methods. 
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Another way to affect the set of matched productions is to modify the conditions of 
existing rules, or to construct variants on existing rules with slightly different condition 
sides.11 In practice, most researchers have opted for the latter approach, sometimes in 
order to model the incremental nature of human learning, and other times responding to 
complexities in the learning task, such as the presence of noise. In such approaches, the 
generation of variants must be combined with methods for modifying the conflict resolution 
process, so that better variants eventually come to mask the rules from which they were 
generated. 
Two obvious methods present themselves for modifying the conditions of productions. 
Although these mechanisms had been present in the AI literature for some time, Anderson, 
Kline & Beasley (1978) were the first to use them in models of human learning, labeling 
them with the terms generalization and discrimination. The first process involves the 
creation of a new rule (or modifying an existing one) so that it is more general than an 
existing rule, while retaining the same actions. The term "generalization" has also been 
used to denote any process for moving from data to some general rule or hypothesis, 
but Anderson intended a much more specific sense. The second process of discrimination 
involves the creation of a new rule (or modifying an existing one) so that it is less general 
than an existing rule, while retaining the same actions. In their effects, the two mechanisms 
lead to opposite results, though in most models they are not inverses in terms of the 
conditions under which they are evoked. 
Within production system models, there are three basic ways to form more general or 
specific rules, each corresponding to a different notion of generality. First, one can add or 
delete conditions from the left-hand side of a production. The former generates a more 
specific rule, since it will match in fewer situations, while the latter gives a more general 
rule. The second method involves replacing variables with constant terms or vice versa. 
Changing variables to constants reduces generality, while changing constants to variables 
increases generality. The final method revolves around the notion of class variables or 
is-a hierarchies. For example, one may know that both dogs and cats are mammals, and 
that both mammals and birds are vertebrates. Replacing a term from this hierarchy with 
one below it in the hierarchy decreases generality, while the inverse operation increases 
generality. 
These techniques have been used in programs modeling behavior on concept acquisition 
experiments (Anderson & Kline, 1979), language comprehension and production at various 
age levels (Langley, 1982; Anderson, 1981), geometry theorem proving (Anderson, Greeno, 
Kline & Neves, 1981), and various puzzle-solving tasks (Langley, 1982). Although we will 
not elaborate on these learning mechanisms here, Langley (this volume) describes them in 
considerable detail. 
11 For this to be different from simply adding a new production, another constraint is 
required: the conditions must be composed of simple parts, rather than invocations to 
very powerful predicates. If such predicates were allowed, one might change the matched 
set by redefining some predicate in an arbitrary manner. Although theoretically possible, 
this scheme would make the learning process hopelessly complex. 
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Note that methods like discrimination and generalization directly respond to the char-
acterization issue we described in the last section. Both methods require instances that 
have been clustered into some class, and both attempt to generate some general description 
of those classes based on the observed instances. As one might expect, these methods were 
first proposed by researchers working on the task learning from examples (Winston, 1975; 
Hayes-Roth & McDermott, 1978; Mitchell, 1982; Brazdil, 1978). 
Once a set of matching rule instantiations have been found, a production system archi-
tecture still must make some determination about which instantiation(s) in that set will be 
executed. Thus, conflict resolution offers another decision point in the recognize-act cycle 
where the behavior of the system can be affected. This turns out to be particularly im-
portant because many models of human learning attempt to model its incremental nature, 
assuming that learning involves the construction of successively closer approximations to 
correct knowledge over a series of experiences. 
The knowledge represented in new production rules are essentially hypotheses about 
the correct rules. A learning system must maintain a balance between the need for feedback 
obtained by trying new productions and the need for stable performance obtained by 
relying on those productions that have proved themselves successful. This means that a 
learning system must distinguish between rule applicability and rule desirability, and be 
able to alter its selections as it discovers more about desirability. Production systems have 
embodied a number of schemes for performing conflict resolution, ranging from simple 
fixed orderings on the rules in PSG (Newell & McDermott, 1975) and PAS (Waterman, 
1975), to various forms of weights or "strengths" (Anderson, 1976; Langley, this volume), 
to complex schemes that are not uniform across the entire set of productions as in HPM 
(Neches, this volume). Combined with certain timing assumptions, these schemes can be 
used to predict speedup effects as well as affecting more global behavior. 
Any production system model of learning must take into account the parameters used 
during conflict resolution. This concern goes beyond learning models, since any system 
with multiple context-sensitive knowledge sources may have overlapping knowledge items 
that conflict.12 However, the problems of conflict resolution are exacerbated in a learning 
system because the knowledge items being resolved may change over time, and because 
new items must be added with consideration for how conflicts with existing items will be 
handled. Later in the chapter, we will return to the constraints that learning imposes on 
acceptable conflict resolution mechanisms. 
After conflicts have been dealt with, the instantiations(s) selected for execution are 
applied. Although the opportunities arising at this point largely parallel those involved in 
matching, there is little parallel in the methods that have been proposed. For instance, 
one can imagine methods that add or delete the actions of existing rules, but we know of 
only one such suggestion in the literature (Anderson, 1983). 
However, three additional learning mechanisms have been proposed that lead to rules 
with new conditions and actions. The first of these is known as composition, and was orig-
12 The traditional example used to illustrate this point contrasts the two pieces of decision-
making advice - "Look before you leap" and "He who hesitates is lost". 
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inally proposed by Lewis (1978) to account for speedup as the result of practice. Basically, 
this method combines two or more rules into a new rule with the conditions and actions 
of the component rules. However, conditions that are guaranteed to be met by one of the 
actions are not included. For instance, if we compose the rules (A B -+ C D) and (D E 
-+ F), the rule (A B E -+ C D F) would result. Of course, the process is not quite this 
simple; most composition methods are based on instantiations of productions rather than 
the rules themselves, and one must take variable bindings into account in generating the 
new rule. The presence of negated conditions also complicates matters. 
Note that composition is a form of chunking, and thus is one response to the aggrega-
tion problem we discussed earlier. However, the combination procedure outlined above is 
not sufficient; this must be combined with some theory about the conditions under which 
such combinations occur. Some theories of composition (Lewis, 1978; Neves & Anderson, 
1981) assume that composition occurs whenever two rules apply in sequence, while others 
(Anderson, 1983) posit that composition transpires whenever some goal is achieved. Nat-
urally, different conditions for chunking lead to radically different forms of learning. The 
chapter by Lewis describes the composition process in more detail. 
Newell & Rosenbloom (1981) have proposed another response to the aggregation issue 
in their theory of learning by chunking, showing that the learning curves predicted by their 
model are quite similar to those observed in a broad range of learning tasks. The chapter 
by Rosenbloom and Newell (this volume) presents results from this approach to modeling 
practice effects. 
Yet another mechanism for creating new rules has been called proceduralization (Neves 
& Anderson, 1981). This involves constructing a very specific version of some general rule, 
based on some instantiation of the rule that has been applied. Ohlsson (this volume) has 
used a similar mechanism to model learning on transitive reasoning tasks. In some ways, 
this method can be viewed as a form of discrimination learning, since it generates more 
specific variants of an existing rule. However, the conditions for application tend to be 
quite different, and the use to which these methods have been put have quite different 
flavors. For instance, discrimination has been used almost entirely to account for reducing 
search or eliminating errors, while proceduralization has been used to account for speedup 
effects and automatization. But perhaps these are simply different names for the results 
of the same underlying phenomena. 
Additional Learning Mechanisms 
Langley, Neches, Neves & Anzai (1980) have argued that self-modifying systems must 
address two related problems: inducing correct rules for when to perform the various actions 
available to the system, and developing interesting new actions to perform. However, most 
of the models that have been developed in recent years have focused on the first of these 
issues, and some researchers (e.g., Anderson, 1983) have asserted that mechanisms such as 
composition, generalization, and discrimination are sufficient to account for all learning. 
Nevertheless, evidence is starting to build up that these processes, although apparently 
necessary components of a computational learning theory, are by no means sufficient. The 
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evidence for this comes from a number of recent studies which have tried to characterize 
differences between the strategies employed by experts and novices. For example, Lewis 
{1981) has documented differences between expert and novice solution methods for algebra 
expressions, and shown that the differences could not have been produced by composition. 
Lewis' argument consists of a demonstration that the procedures produced by a process 
of composition would not apply correctly in all cases. In order to ensure that a new 
procedure would work correctly, additional rules must be produced by some process other 
than composition. 
Another example of complex expert strategies appears in Hunter's (1968) analysis of 
the procedures employed by a "mental calculator", a subject with highly exceptional skills 
at mental arithmetic. There appear to be a number of aspects to the subject's special 
abilities. Some, such as his large collection of number facts, might be explained in terms of 
mechanisms like the Neves & Anderson (1981) "knowledge compilation" model. However, 
there are many aspects of the subject's performance for which it is very difficult to see how 
syntactic learning mechanisms could have produced the observed results. 
For instance, Hunter found that his subject's superior ability to mentally solve large 
multiplication problems was due to a procedure that performed the component multipli-
cations in left-to-right order while keeping a running total of the intermediate products. 
This contrasts to the traditional pencil-and-paper algorithm in which columns are multi-
plied right-to-left, with the sub-products written down and totaled afterwards in order to 
compute the product. The left-to-right procedure, which drastically reduced the working 
memory demands of any given problem, requires a massive re-organization of the control 
structure for the traditional multiplication procedure. 
The re-organization involves much more than refinements in the rules governing when 
sub-operations are performed. Such refinements could presumably be produced by gener-
alization and discrimination mechanisms. However, producing this new procedure requires 
the introduction of new operations (or at least new goal structures), such as those involved 
in keeping a running total of the sub-products. Those new operations, and the control 
structure governing the sequence of their execution, require the introduction of novel ele-
ments or goals - something that generalization, discrimination, and composition are clearly 
not able to do. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from studies on expert/novice differences in physics 
problem solving (Simon & Simon, 1978; Larkin, 1981). A general observation in those 
studies is that experts rely on working-forward strategies while novices are much more 
inclined to use means-ends analysis. Generally, the mechanism used to explain this relies 
on a method first developed by Anzai called "block-elimination" (Anzai & Simon, 1979). In 
this method, one remembers a state S in which some desired action (operator) A cannot 
be executed because its preconditions are not met. If heuristic search later generates 
another action B that eliminates the blockage (enabling A to be applied), then a new rule 
is constructed. This rule has the form "If you are in state S and you want to apply action 
A, then try to apply action B." In other words, this approach leads to new subgoals and 
to rules which propose when they should be generated. 
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The examples presented thus far provide motivation for seeking learning mechanisms 
beyond composition, proceduralization, generalization, and discrimination. However, our 
argument has rested on cases in which no evidence was available about the intermediate 
forms of the acquired procedures. There are very few studies in which learning sequences, 
and the intermediate procedures produced within them, have been directly observed. For-
tunately, a similar picture emerges from two studies in which those observations could be 
made. 
In the first of these studies, Neches (1981b) traced procedure development in the 
command sequences issued by an expert user of a computer graphics editing system. In 
doing this, he found a number of changes that involving re-ordering operations and re-
planning procedure segments on the basis of efficiency considerations. In the second study, 
Anzai & Simon (1979) examined a subject solving and re-solving a five-disk Tower of 
Hanoi puzzle. They found a number of changes in procedure that seemed inconsistent 
with strict composition/ generalization/ discrimination models. These included eliminating 
moves that· produced returns to previously visited problem states, establishing subgoals 
to perform actions that eliminated barriers to desired actions, and transforming partially 
specified goals (such as moving a disk off a peg) into fully-specified goals (such as moving 
the disk from the peg to a specific other peg). 
A key observation about the above examples is that the learning appears to involve 
reasoning on the basis of knowledge about the structure of procedures in general, and the 
semantics of a given procedure in particular. In each of the examples we have considered, 
procedures were modified through the construction of novel elements rather than through 
simple deletions, additions, or combinations of existing elements. This leads us to believe 
there exist important aspects of learning that involve the use of both general and domain-
specific knowledge about procedures. The chapter by Neches (this volume) examines this 
form of learning in more detail. 
Implications of Learning for Production System Architectures 
In the preceding sections, we have been concerned with the mapping between learning 
phenomena (viewed from a psychological perspective) and explanations of these phenomena 
in terms of production systems. Attempts to build production system-based learning 
models have led, among other things, to a much better understanding of what does and 
does not work in production system architectures. In this section, we try to summarize 
the lessons that that have been learned for three major aspects of production systems. 
Pattern Matching 
In practice, languages for expressing conditions on productions generally turn out 
to be fairly simple. In particular, they generally rely on pattern-matching rather than 
the testing of arbitrary predicates. That is, the language of condition-sides describes 
abstract configurations of data elements. A production's conditions are said to be satisfied 
when data appears in working memory that instantiates the described configuration in a 
consistent manner. This means that the condition side specifies a pattern consisting of 
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constants and variables, and the data in working memory matches that pattern by utilizing 
the same constants in the same places as they appeared in the pattern, with constants-that 
correspond to variables in the pattern appearing consistently in the same places as those 
variables. 
The description in the preceding paragraph may seem both obvious and redundant, 
given our discussion of production systems. However, note that rule-based systems need 
not operate within a pattern-matching paradigm. In principle, the condition sides of pro-
duction rules could be arbitrarily complex and have arbitrarily powerful predicates.13 From 
a logical standpoint, any class of expressions that evaluated to true or false (applicable or 
not-applicable) could serve to specify production conditions. It is worthwhile to examine 
the advantages of the pattern-matching paradigm. We will argue that there are three 
constraints on production systems which have emerged from learning research, and which 
the pattern-matching paradigm serves to satisfy: 
• EffiCiency and adaptivity - Since the grain size of productions is relatively small (i.e., 
little happens with each production firing), and since humans are real-time systems 
that must make timely responses to external events, it is important to iterate through 
the recognize-act cycle as quickly as possible. 
• Even granularity - Learning mechanisms often depend on taking fragments of different 
existing rules, making inferences about the contribution of those fragments to the 
"success" or "failure" of the rule, and modifying rules by adding or deleting those 
fragments. Therefore, it is important that those fragments all represent small and 
approximately equal units of knowledge. If a fragment represents too large a decision, 
then the reasoning that went into that decision is not accessible to learning mechanisms. 
This means that that reasoning cannot be re-used elsewhere if it is correct, and cannot 
be corrected if it is not. 
• Analyzability - As just mentioned, learning mechanisms operate by manipulating frag-
ments of rules (or instantiations of rules), either to construct new rules or to "edit" 
existing rules. This can only occur if the mechanisms can predict the effect their ma-
nipulations will have on behavior, and this in turn requires that there be consistent 
principles about the nature of conditions and the effects of altering them. Put another 
way, for learning mechanisms to operate in a domain-independent way (i.e., without 
built-in knowledge about the domain in which learning is taking place), these mecha-
nisms must operate on the structure or syntax of productions, rather than upon their 
content or semantics. 
To understand the implications of these constraints, let us first consider why they rule out 
the extreme opposite of pattern matching: using the connectives of first-order predicate 
calculus to combine predicates implemented as functions that return a truth value. In a 
rule-based system that allowed such conditions, one could generate rules with condition 
sides that required extremely long (if not infinite) amounts of time to test, thus violating the 
efficiency constraint. It would be possible to (in fact, it would be difficult not to) have a set 
of predicates that differed widely in their complexity, sophistication, and generality, thus 
13 For an extreme example of this approach, see Lenat (1977). 
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discussion of these issues, see McDermott & Forgy (1978).) The production system must 
give enough priority to the results of its own recent activity to focus upon a goal and carry 
it through to completion (as opposed to oscillating between many different goals while 
only slowly making progress on any given goal). At the same time, humans must interact 
with an external environment, and this requires that production system models of human 
behavior be able to shift attention in response to events in the outside world. 
In order to meet these demands, production systems generally employ a hybrid ap-
proach, in which the set of applicable productions is whittled down by applying a sequence 
of conflict resolution policies, rather than a single all-encompassing policy. OPS2 (Forgy 
& McDermott, 1977) is an example of this approach. The OPS3 conflict resolution scheme 
operates in five successive stages: 
• Refraction: Once executed, an instantiation of a given production may not be executed 
again (until one of the matched elements has been deleted and readded to working 
memory); 
. • Recency: Production instantiations matching recently asserted data should be selected 
over those matching older data; 
• Specificity: Instantiations of productions with the greatest number of condition ele-
ments and constant terms should be selected; 
• Production recency: Instantiations of recently created productions should be selected 
over those from older productions; 
• Random selection: If the above rules were not sufficient to produce a unique selection, 
then a production instantiation should be chosen at random. 
These policies were intended to satisfy a number of concerns. Refraction ensured that the 
system would move on to new tasks and would not tend to enter infinite loops. Recency 
ensured that the system would not tend to oscillate between goals, but would focus on the 
most recent one, attending to that goal until it was accomplished. At the same time, this 
policy still allowed for switching attention in response to external events, since those also 
would entail new data in working memory. 
The third criterion, specificity, attempted to ensure that the "best" production would 
be selected. Since rules containing more conditions and more constant terms tend to 
be more specific than those with fewer conditions or constants, and therefore the one 
most closely tailored to fit the current situation, they should be most appropriate. The 
criterion of production recency was intended to favor the results of learning. Much like 
the notions behind production ordering, the assumption was that new rules were likely to 
be improvements over old rules, and therefore should be given an opportunity to mask the 
prior ones. The final policy of random selection was intended to ensure that the system 
would only fire one production per cycle; in parallel systems that allow more than one 
production to be executed in a cycle, it is possible to execute productions that are at 
cross-purposes. 
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Policies like those in the OPS family of languages have generally been successful at 
controlling production systems that do not change greatly. They have been used in practi-
ca}applications, such as McDermott's (1982) Rl expert system, involving large numbers of 
productions and calling for a high degree of efficiency. However, though they are clearly an 
improvement, such policies have not proved completely satisfactory where learning is con-
cerned. Fortunately, Forgy's (1979b) work on matching provides a method for efficiently 
computing all matched rules. This in turn provides considerable flexibility in the conflict 
resolution process, so that one is not locked into a particular set of decision criteria. 
One early target of dissatisfaction concerned criteria that favored newly acquired rules 
over older rules. Such policies ignored the need for learning mechanisms that relied on 
incremental refinement of rules. Any policy that always favors new productions ignores the 
possibility that intermediate stages of learning might produce errorful rules. Furthermore, 
such a policy provides no help in selecting between multiple variants of an existing rule 
which are generated by some learning mechanisms. Langley's work on the AMBER and 
SAGE systems (this volume) illustrates both the problems and the general approach taken 
towards solving them in many recent production system architectures. 
The basic idea was to introduce a notion of production strength ~s a factor in conflict 
resolution. The strength (or weight) of a production is a parameter that is adjusted to 
indicate the system's current confidence in the correctness and/or usefulness of that rule. 
There have been a number of different approaches taken in various production system 
architectures toward making use of this general concept. In some variants, the strength 
or weight of productions are subject to a threshold; rules below the threshold simply are 
not considered. In other variants, the strength is a positive factor in selection; "stronger" 
rules are preferred over weaker ones. In still other variants, the notion of strength is used 
to make selection less deterministic; strength is treated as a measure of the probability 
that a rule will fire given that its conditions are satisfied. 
Although these variants all make different statements about the precise usage of pro-
duction strength, the particular mechanisms all serve a common purpose- enabling a phase 
of evaluation and testing for proposed rules, rather than forcing an all-or-nothing decision 
about them. To this end, mechanisms for affecting the strength of a rule are needed. Some 
researchers have postulated automatic mechanisms. For example, in Langley's AMBER 
and SAGE systems (this volume), a rule is strengthened each time a learning mechanism 
rediscovers it; thus, more weight is given to rules that have been learned a number of times, 
even if they have been created by different learning methods. 
Although the notion of production strength is probably the major change in production 
·system architectures that has resulted from research on learning, other problems have 
also received attention. In particular, Neches (198lb) has argued that a uniform conflict 
resolution scheme places an excessive burden on learning mechanisms. (By a uniform 
conflict resolution scheme, we mean a set of conflict resolution policies that are applied 
consistently to all applicable productions with no special exceptions.) The argument, 
which is only briefly touched upon in his chapter in this volume, is that a uniform conflict 
resolution scheme forces several different kinds of knowledge to be confounded in the 
conditions of productions. Three kinds are particularly important: 
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• Conditions that define the context in which the production is applicable - in other 
words, knowledge about the circumstances in which it is meaningful to execute the 
production; 
• Conditions that enable processing on the action side of a rule, usually by causing values 
to be assigned to variables that are referenced on the action side - in other words, 
knowledge about prerequisite information for operations on the right-hand side; 
• Conditions that serve to affect fl.ow of control by causing otherwise applicable produc-
tions to be inapplicable or by affecting the ranking of applicable productions during 
the selection process - in other words, heuristic knowledge about desired sequencing 
of productions. 
In response to these observations, Neches has proposed having different conflict resolution 
associated with different classes of rules, with each class being responsible for different 
aspects of behavior. 
Working Memory 
All modern notions of the human information processing architecture, although differ-
ing in their details, agree on the importance of distinguishing two aspects of memory. On 
the one hand, there seems to be a limited capacity working memory that changes rapidly 
over time. Working memory plays the same role for humans as input/output buffers and 
processing registers play for computers. On the other hand, there is also a large capacity, 
long term memory that is much more stable. We have already seen how production system 
models instantiate this distinction. 
The production system for subtraction that we presented earlier was quite simple, re-
quiring only a few types of working memory elements. However, this was a performance 
model, and learning systems require more information than is strictly necessary for perfor-
mance.14 This extra information must be retained somewhere, and the most likely place 
is working memory. Thus, a focus on learning imposes constraints on models of working 
memory that would not arise from a concern with performance alone. 
The state of the art is not sufficiently advanced that we can exhaustively list all of the 
different kinds of information used by learning mechanisms, but we can extract a partial 
list from the mechanisms discussed elsewhere in this chapter. For example, the minimum 
information requirements of composition methods are behavioral records (in the form of 
at least two production instantiations), along with temporal information (in the form of 
14 For example, Neches (1981b) compares a production system for learning an addition 
procedure (also described in his chapter in this volume) with another production system 
that was adequate for performing the task, but which did not carry the information needed 
for his learning mechanisms to operate. Although the number of productions contained in 
the two systems was approximately the same, the "complexity" of the productions needed 
in the learning system was almost three times greater for both of two different measures. 
(Complexity was measured by the number of symbols and the number of propositions 
appearing in the production.) 
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the sequential ordering between the two instantiations). 
Generalization and discrimination methods require more information, including knowl-
edge of the success /failure of rules and the context in which that success or failure occurred. 
In simple tasks such as learning from examples, immediate feedback is provided to the 
learner. However, more complex learning tasks require the system to infer the success or 
failure of individual rules; Minsky (1963) has called this the credit assignment problem. 
Moreover, since credit or blame may not be assigned to a rule until long after it has applied, 
the context of that application (generally the state of working memory at that point) must 
be stored for later retrieval. 
For example, when generalization and discrimination methods are used to determine 
heuristic conditions for problem-solving operators (Sleeman, Langley & Mitchell, 1982), 
the learning system must retain information about its search towards a problem solu-
tion. After the problem is solved by weak search methods, feedback is obtained by asking 
whether or not actions that were tried were on the final solution path. Credit assignment is 
performed by attributing success to the productions that suggested actions on the solution 
path, and by attributing failure to productions that suggested actions· leading off the final 
solution path. In these more sophisticated models, information must be retained about 
the sequential ordering of previous knowledge states, as well as the states themselves. 
Similar themes can be found in Anzai's work on "learning by doing", which is reviewed 
as part of his chapter in this book. Anzai models a number of complementary processes 
that contribute to the development of procedures for solving problems that can initially 
only be solved by general search methods. His view of learning involves several phases. 
In the first phase, a system learns to narrow the search space by avoiding unproductive 
branches in the search tree ("bad moves"). The key to this phase is the use of heuristics for 
identifying bad branches, such as noting action sequences which return a problem solution 
to a previous state. This first phase involves retaining much the same sort of knowledge 
as required by generalization and discrimination. 
In Anzai's second phase of learning, a system attempts to infer subgoals ("good 
moves"). This depends on noting actions that cannot be carried out when they are first 
proposed because some preconditions are violated, but which are applied later, after an-
other action has satisfied those preconditions. This second phase of learning requires 
information that goes beyond that needed for the first phase, since it must retain in mem-
ory both unsatisfied goals and the reasons they were not satisfied. More generally, the 
kind of information being retained has to do with planning, that is, the consideration of 
actions separate from the performance of those actions. 
Anzai's later phases of learning involve acquiring associations between action sequences 
and the subgoals learned in the second phase, as well as grouping sequences into useful 
units. Thus, the subgoals acquired in the preceding phase now become additional infor-
mation items which must be retained. 
The developmental mechanisms described in the chapter on BAIRN by Wallace, Klahr, 
and Bluff rely on analyzing and comparing multiple sequences of actions. The informa-
tion required to do so is organized primarily at the level of "nodes", which are groups of 
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related productions. (Nodes may be loosely analogized to Anzai's subgoals, but are much 
more fundamental to the BAIRN architecture.) A "time line" represents the chronological 
sequence of node activations, along with the activating input, the resulting state, and a 
flag for cases of unexpected results. (Thus, information about expectations is an addi-
tional implicit aspect of the information demands of their learning model.) If a node is 
in "focal consciousness" (i.e., in the foreground of conscious attention), then information 
is also retained about the sequence of productions fired in the course of processing that 
node. In addition to this information, the learning mechanisms also make use of an "ex-
perience list" associated with each node, which contains the memory of action sequences 
that commonly follow the given node. BAIRN also makes use of information about the 
applicability conditions of nodes, and about their superordinate/subordinate relationships 
to other nodes. 
The strategy transformation model described in Neches' chapter focuses on the refine-
ment and optimization of procedures that are already well-defined. His approach postulates 
a set of heuristics for detecting opportunities to improve the cognitive efficiency of proce-
dures. After analyzing the information requirements of these heuristics, he proposed eleven 
information categories utilized by his learning mechanisms.15 Most of the cases described 
above also seem to fit into these categories: 
1. goals and procedures; 
2. episodes - the structure representing a single problem solution; 
3. events - individual instances of goals with particular inputs; 
4. inputs - internal concepts or representations of external states considered by a goal; 
5. results - concepts or state representations resulting from a goal; 
6. relationships between goals and their subgoals; 
7. the effort associated with achieving a goal; 
8. temporal orderings of events (or production firings); 
9. processing information (size of working memory, presence in working memory, etc.); 
10. descriptive information - assertions about properties associated with a concept; 
11. frequency information - knowledge about how frequently a concept is accessed. 
The work by Neches and others indicates the large variety of information that is prereq-
uisite to learning. This also has implications for the sheer amount of information that a 
learning/ performance system must be able to sift through. Models of performance, or even 
of particular learning mechanisms, can gloss over this issue by considering only the infor-
mation relevant to the topic being modeled. However, a complete model of an information 
processing system must address the entire range of information categories. 
15 Implicitly, there is a twelfth category: information about production instantiations, i.e., 
linkages between concepts referenced in a production's condition side and to the concepts 
resulting from its action side. 
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model. We urge readers to consider the following chapters with respect to the checklist 
of issues that can be constructed from these two themes. The first theme was essentially 
oriented towards characterizing the methods necessary in a complete learning system. The 
second was concerned with the goals of learning systems. 
(1) Under the rubric of "components of learning", we presented some assertions about re-
quirements for learning systems. We argued that there were four sub-problems which 
all learning researchers must address - either by providing mechanisms in their model, 
or by narrowing their self-assigned mission so as to render the requirement moot. Ag-
gregation is the problem of identifying the data from which learning will be done, 
separating signal from noise as it were. Clustering is the problem of developing ex-
tensional definitions for concepts based on those data (e.g., recognizing positive and 
negative instances of a concept). Characterization is the problem of developing inten-
sional hypotheses or descriptions of concepts and classes identified in clustering, so that 
instances not previously encountered can be recognized and utilized. Storage/Indexing 
is the problem of saving those characterizations so that they can be retrieved and 
applied in appropriate situations. 
(2) Under the various headings of "correct vs. interesting" or "applicability vs. desirabil-
it'!/', we suggested that learning is focussed towards some purpose. Learning systems 
must address two concerns. They must ensure that the conditions of their new rules 
are (or eventually will become) correct, in the sense that the rules are applicable when-
ever appropriate and not applicable under any other circumstances. They must also 
ensure that the actions of these rules are useful, in the sense that there is some criteria 
by which the system is better off for having behaved according to its new rules rather 
than its old ones. Not everything that could be learned is worth learning; therefore, 
mechanisms that produce correct rules do not necessarily produce useful rules. 
Introducing Learning Mechanisms into Production System Architectures 
Operationalized into production system terms, a system has "learned" if, as a result of 
experience, it comes to apply a different production in some situation than it would have 
applied in the equivalent situation at an earlier point in its lifetime. Given the processing 
cycle of production system architectures, all learning mechanisms can be characterized as 
seeking to accomplish this goal by manipulating one or more of the following processes 
within that cycle: production matching, conflict resolution, and application. 
We also presented several constraints to which learning systems are subject, and ar-
gued that the natures of both learning mechanisms and production system architectures 
are shaped by the need to interact in ways that satisfy these constraints. Among the 
constraints considered were efficiency and adaptivity, even granularity of rules, and an-
alyzability of rules. In preceding sections, we indicated how these constraints have led 
modern production system theories in particular directions. These include favoring ex-
haustive pattern matching processes over other possible ways of stating and testing pro-
duction conditions, moves towards refined conflict resolution techniques involving notions 
like "strength" of production rules, and an increased emphasis on building a sensitivity 
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to goals into the architecture for both conflict resolution and control of working memory 
contents. 
We hope that the present chapter has provided a useful overview of production systems 
and their role in modeling learning and development. As we will see in the following 
chapters, different researchers have taken quite different paths in developing self-modifying 
production systems. However, underlying these differences are a common set of goals and 
a common framework, and it is these common concerns that we have attempted to present. 
We believe that the production system approach holds great promise for understanding 
the nature of human learning and development, and we hope that future researchers will 
build upon the excellent beginning described in the chapters that follow. 
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